Abstract Introduction and Objectives: After a ten-year period of passivity in the regional equations of the Middle East, Russia entered regional issues since 2000 and with Putin coming to power, and the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010, it gradually entered this crisis in the process of the civil war in Syria, and at the same time, it began broader regional interactions with the countries of the region, especially Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Therefore, if the Syrian crisis since 2012 has provided the basis for the formation of a new Middle East policy for Russia, it seems that the fall of the Syrian government in 2024 will be an important turning point in the fundamental transformation in this policy. Accordingly, the main objective of this article is to examine this important transformation and its consequences and answer the question of how to analyze Russian policy in the new period?
Methods: To discuss about the main idea of this article, we will try to use the qualitative analysis method of the hypothesis variables and their important indicators and show how they are related. Therefore, by studying the process of developments in Russian foreign policy from the beginning of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 to the fall of Damascus, the state of change in the country's priorities in other regions of the world and especially the Middle East, taking into account field realities, the National Security Strategy document in 2022, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept document in 2023, official statements of government organizations, statements by senior government officials, as well as field developments, we will qualitatively analyze them and their impact on the country's Middle East policy. Therefore, first, we will discuss the most important features of Russia's Middle East policy in the years 2010 to 2021. Then, we will examine the 2022 Ukrainian war and its impact on Russian foreign policy. Finally, we will conclude the discussions by analyzing Russia's Middle East policy in the period after the fall of the Syrian government from 2024.
Results and discussion: The findings of this article show that Russia has transformed from an important military and political actor into a purely economic actor and this situation will continue for the coming years. Therefore, the process of expanding economic relations that began since the Ukrainian war has increased again and this issue will be the main theme of regional cooperation and interactions of this country. This change was mainly raised since the beginning of the Ukrainian war and this war became such a priority for the Russian government that it overshadowed other regions and issues. In addition to indicating the internal issues, problems and limitations in Russia for pursuing two international crises at the same time, this issue also shows that Russia's regional policy has also focused more than ever on the immediate external environment, especially what is called the Russian world. From a trans-regional and global perspective, Russia will naturally not be able to engage in more conflicts, and therefore we will witness developments not only in Russia's regional policy in the Middle East but also in the global environment.
Conclusion: Despite these serious moves, Russia’s Middle East policy has been largely reactive and lacking in strategic depth. In fact, Russia’s strategic issues over the four decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union have remained largely domestic, Eurasian, and related to threats and engagement with the West. Therefore, acting in the Middle East and other regions has remained on the fringes of Russia’s main strategic issue. In the Middle East, the Kremlin’s focus has been on Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel, and this situation seems likely to continue. With the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Russia’s problems have intensified and the limited possibilities for possible military and security acting have been removed from the orbit for years. With Trump’s coming to power, there is a possibility of Russia reaching an agreement with the United States and initiating peace talks with Ukraine, and it seems that if Russia can withdraw from the Ukrainian war, it will not be involved in sensitive international issues outside the immediate Eurasian environment for a long time. Therefore, it does not seem that Russia will be involved in Middle East security games for at least ten years, and Russia’s economic relations with the countries of the region will continue. If relations between Iran and the West deteriorate over the nuclear issue and a possible war with Israel or the United States breaks out, it is unlikely that Russia will play any role other than issuing a statement condemning the aggressor and calling for diplomatic channels.
Keywords: Russia, Middle East, Syria, regional balance, security strategy, economic relations