Document Type : Original Article
Author
Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Tehran, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Today, the world is involved in complex issues and many dangers. The existence of increasing competition, diverse and conflicting cultures, power struggles and economic inequalities indicates that different actors have different goals and objectives. In fact, one of the main reasons for the growth and increasing activity of different terrorist groups can be seen as the lack of global coherence and convergence in counter-terrorism policies. This article seeks to explore the fundamental question of what is the rationale for global convergence in the fight against terrorism? This article believes that there is a strategic logic for convergence and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, which can be seen from the approach of theories such as ancient Chinese wisdom, game theory and also in the theory of moving target and pursuing global counter-terrorism goals. Emphasizing the various strategic advantages of global convergence in the fight against terrorism, this paper seeks to conclude that countries need to reach a point of strategic understanding where mutual cooperation is a priority for mutual benefit. In other words, if there is no global convergence and cooperation to deal with terrorism, terrorism in the world will find an opportunity to attack more and create more dangers. Finally, the main solutions through which international security algorithms can improve the efficiency of advanced algorithms will be proposed.
Keywords
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Arie Perliger & Daniel Milton (2018) Fighting together? understanding bilateral
cooperation in the realm of counterterrorism, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 11:3, 199-
220, DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2018.1517944
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. In The economic
dimensions of crime (pp. 13–68). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved
from https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/259394
Benjamin, D., & Simon, S. (2003). The age of sacred terror: Radical Islam’s war against
America. New York: Random House.
Bensahel, N. (2003). The counterterror coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO and the
European union. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Bossong, R. (2012). The evolution of EU counterterrorism: European security policy after
9/11. London: Routledge
Bowen, W. Q., Matthew, C., & Christopher, H. (2012). Multilateral cooperation and the
prevention of nuclear terrorism: Pragmatism over idealism. International Affairs, 88(2),
349–368.
Brandt, P. T., & Sandler, T. (2010). What do transnational terrorists target? Has it changed?
Are we safer? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(2), 214–236.
Bremer, L. P. (2001). A new strategy for the new face of terrorism. National Interest, 65,
23–30.
Brown, D. (2010). The European union, counter terrorism and police co-operation, 1992–
2007: Unsteady foundations? Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Cai, G.-l., Wang, B.-s., & Xing, Q.-q. (2017). Game theoretic analysis for the mechanism
of moving target defense. Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic
Engineering, 18(12), 2017–2034. doi: 10.1631/FITEE.1601797
Carter, K. M., Riordan, J. F., & Okhravi, H. (2014). A game theoretic approach to strategy
determination for dynamic platform defenses. In Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on
moving target defense (pp. 21–30). Scottsdale: ACM.
Colbaugh, R., & Glass, K. (2012). Predictability-oriented defense against adaptive
adversaries. In 2012 IEEE international conference on systems, man, and cybernetics
(SMC) (pp. 2721–2727). Seoul: IEEE.
Cole, E. (2013). Advanced persistent threat: Understanding the danger and how to protect
your organization. Waltham: Syngress.
Crelinsten, R. (1989). Terrorism and international cooperation. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Crenshaw, M. 2007. “The debate over “new” vs. “old” terrorism,” presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August
30-September 2, 2007.
Devost, M. G., Houghton, B. K., & Pollard, N. A. (1997). Information terrorism: Can you
trust your toaster? In R. E. Neilson (Ed.), Sun Tzu and information warfare: A collection of
winning papers from the Sun Tzu Art of war in information warfare
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Dutta, P. K. (1999). Strategies and games: Theory and practice. Cambridge & London: The
MIT Press.
Duyvesteyn, I. (2004). How new is the new terrorism? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
27(5), 439–454. Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2000). Is transnational terrorism becoming
more threatening? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(3), 307–332
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2000). Is transnational terrorism becoming more threatening?
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(3), 307–332.
Eric Rosand , Alistair Millar & Jason Ipe (2009) Enhancing counterterrorism cooperation in
eastern Africa, African Security Studies, 18:2, 93-106, DOI:
10.1080/10246029.2009.9627532
Feng, X., Zheng, Z., Cansever, D., Swami, A., & Mohapatra, P. (2017). A Signaling game
model for moving target defense. In IEEE INFOCOM 2017-IEEE conference on computer
communications (pp. 1–9). IEEE.
Friedrichs, J. (2008). Fighting Terrorism and Drugs. London: Routledge
Gharibi, H., Namdar Vandaee, S. (2020). United Nations Security Council and Establishing
Counter Terrorism Regime. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 23(89), 255-282.(In Persian)
Hegemannm, H. (2015). International counterterrorism bureaucracies in the United Nations
and the European Union. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian persuasion. American Economic
Review, 101(6), 2590–2615. doi: 10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
Kaspersky Lab. (2019). What is zero day exploit? Retrieved from
Kaspersky: https://www.kaspersky.com/resource-center/definitions/zero-day-exploit
Landes, W. M. (1978). An economic study of US aircraft hijacking. The Journal of Law
and Economics, 21(1), 1–31. Retrieved
from https://www.nber.org/papers/w0210.pdf doi: 10.1086/466909
Laqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction.
London: Oxford University Press.
Lei, C., Ma, D.-H., & Zhang, H.-Q. (2017). Optimal strategy selection for moving target
defense based on Markov game. IEEE Access, 5, 156–169.
doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2633983
Lesser, I. O., Hoffman, B., Arquilla, J., Ronfeldt, D., Zanini, M., & Jenkins, B. M. (1999).
Countering the new terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Manadhata, P. K. (2013). Game theoretic approaches to attack surface shifting.
In S. Jajodia, A. K. Ghosh, V. Subrahmanian, V. Swarup, C. Wang, & X.
S. Wang (Eds.), Moving target defense II: Application of game theory and adversarial
modeling (pp. 1–14). New York, Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London: Springer. [Crossref],
Milgrom, Paul. "Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation." RAND Journal of Economics
15, no. 2 (1984): 305-309 .
Müller-Wille, B. (2008). The effect of International terrorism on EU Intelligence co-
operation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(1), 49–73.
Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 4(2), 286–295. Retrieved from https://www.cs.upc.edu/~ia/nash51.pdf doi: 10.2307/1969529
Nesi, G. (2006). International cooperation in counter-terrorism: The United Nations and
regional organizations in the fight against terrorism. Hampshire, England: Ashgate
Publishing.
Neumann, J. v., & Morgenstern, O. (2007). Theory of games and economic behavior (60th
Anniversary ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Error! Filename not specified.
Niou, E. M., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1994). A game-theoretic interpretation of Sun Tzu's The
Art of War. Journal of Peace Research, 31(2), 161–174. Retrieved
from https://sites.duke.edu/niou/files/2011/06/08-Sun-Tzu-English-
version.pdf doi: 10.1177/0022343394031002004
Ogilvie- White, T. (2006). Non proliferation and counter terrorism cooperation in southeast
Asia: Meeting global obligations through regional security architectures? Contemporary
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 28(1), 1–26.
Peter, C. (1994). EU counterterrorism, the maastricht third pillar, and liberal democratic
acceptability. Terrorism and Political Violence, 6(2), 103–145.
Pita, J., Jain, M., Marecki, J., Ordóñez, F., Portway, C., Tambe, M., … Kraus, S. (2012). De
ployed ARMOR protection: The application of a game-theoretic model for security at the
Los Angeles International Airport. In M. Tambe (Ed.), Security and game theory:
Algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned (pp. 67–87). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Pita, J., Tambe, M., Kiekintveld, C., Cullen, S., & Steigerwald, E. (2012). GUARDS:
Game-theoretic security allocation on a national Scale. In M. Tambe (Ed.), Security and
game theory: Algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned (pp. 107–130). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Prakash, A., & Wellman, M. P. (2015). Empirical game-theoretic analysis for moving target
defense. In Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on moving target defense (pp. 57–
65). Denver: ACM.
Reveron, S. D. (2008). Counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. Journal of Global
Change and Governance, 1(33), 1–13.
Romaniuk, P. (2010). Multilateral counter-terrorism: The global politics of cooperation and
contestation. New York: Routledge.
Rousseau, J.-J. (1984). A discourse on inequality (1984 ed.). (M. Cranston,
trans.). London: Penguin Group.
Sandler, T. (2005). Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism. Public
Choice, 124, 75–93. doi: 10.1007/s11127-005-4747-y
Sandler, T., & Arce, D. G. (2007). Terrorism: A game-theoretic approach.
In T. Sandler & K. Hartley (Eds.), Handbook of defense economics (Vol. 2 (pp. 775–
813). Amsterdam & Oxford: Elsevier B.V.
Sandler, T., & Enders, W. (2004). An economic perspective on transnational
terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(2), 301–316.
doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.12.007
Skyrms, Brian. (2004) The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Smith, M., & Zeigler, S. M. (2017). Terrorism before and after 9/11 – A more dangerous
world? Research and Politics.
Stackelberg, H. v. (2011). In D. Bazin, L. Urch, & R. Hill (Eds.), Market structure and equilibrium (2011 ed.). Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London & New York: Springer.
Saadat, S. Y. (2020) International cooperation for counter-terrorism: a strategic perspective,
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 15:1, 83-93, DOI:
10.1080/18335330.2020.1732451
START. (2018, July). Global terrorism database. Retrieved from National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START): https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
Tsai, J., Rathi, S., Kiekintveld, C., Ordóñez, F., & Tambe, M. (2012). IRIS – A tool for
strategic security allocation in transportation networks. In M. Tambe (Ed.), Security and
game theory: Algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned (pp. 88–106). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Tzu, S. (1963). The art of war (1963 ed.). (S. B. Griffith, trans.). New York: Oxford
University Press.
UN. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development. New
York: United Nations.
UN. (2019). Global indicator framework for the sustainable development goals and targets
of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. New York: United Nations.
Vadlamudi, S. G., Sengupta, S., Taguinod, M., Zhao, Z., Doupé, A., Ahn, G.-J.,
& Kambhampati, S. (2016). Moving target defense for web applications using Bayesian
Stackelberg games. In Proceedings of the 2016 international Conference on Autonomous
Agents & Multiagent systems (pp. 1377–1378). Singapore: International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
Zhu, Q., & Başar, T. (2013). Game-theoretic approach to feedback-driven multi-stage
moving target defense. In D. S.K., N.-R. C., & K. M. (Eds.), Decision and game theory for
security (Vol. 8252 (pp. 246–263). Cham: Springer.
Zhuang, R., DeLoach, S. A., & Ou, X. (2014). Towards a theory of moving target defense.
In Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on moving target defense (pp. 31–
40). Scottsdale: ACM.
trust your toaster? In R. E. Neilson (Ed.), Sun Tzu and information warfare: A collection of
winning papers from the Sun Tzu Art of war in information warfare
competition (p. 70). Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.
Dutta, P. K. (1999). Strategies and games: Theory and practice. Cambridge & London: The
MIT Press.
Duyvesteyn, I. (2004). How new is the new terrorism? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
27(5), 439–454. Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2000). Is transnational terrorism becoming
more threatening? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(3), 307–332
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2000). Is transnational terrorism becoming more threatening?
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(3), 307–332.
Eric Rosand , Alistair Millar & Jason Ipe (2009) Enhancing counterterrorism cooperation in
eastern Africa, African Security Studies, 18:2, 93-106, DOI:
10.1080/10246029.2009.9627532
Feng, X., Zheng, Z., Cansever, D., Swami, A., & Mohapatra, P. (2017). A Signaling game
model for moving target defense. In IEEE INFOCOM 2017-IEEE conference on computer
communications (pp. 1–9). IEEE.
Friedrichs, J. (2008). Fighting Terrorism and Drugs. London: Routledge
Gharibi, H., Namdar Vandaee, S. (2020). United Nations Security Council and Establishing
Counter Terrorism Regime. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 23(89), 255-282.(In Persian)
Hegemannm, H. (2015). International counterterrorism bureaucracies in the United Nations
and the European Union. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian persuasion. American Economic
Review, 101(6), 2590–2615. doi: 10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
Kaspersky Lab. (2019). What is zero day exploit? Retrieved from
Kaspersky: https://www.kaspersky.com/resource-center/definitions/zero-day-exploit
Landes, W. M. (1978). An economic study of US aircraft hijacking. The Journal of Law
and Economics, 21(1), 1–31. Retrieved
from https://www.nber.org/papers/w0210.pdf doi: 10.1086/466909
Laqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction.
London: Oxford University Press.
Lei, C., Ma, D.-H., & Zhang, H.-Q. (2017). Optimal strategy selection for moving target
defense based on Markov game. IEEE Access, 5, 156–169.
doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2633983
Lesser, I. O., Hoffman, B., Arquilla, J., Ronfeldt, D., Zanini, M., & Jenkins, B. M. (1999).
Countering the new terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Manadhata, P. K. (2013). Game theoretic approaches to attack surface shifting.
In S. Jajodia, A. K. Ghosh, V. Subrahmanian, V. Swarup, C. Wang, & X.
S. Wang (Eds.), Moving target defense II: Application of game theory and adversarial
modeling (pp. 1–14). New York, Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London: Springer. [Crossref],
Milgrom, Paul. "Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation." RAND Journal of Economics
15, no. 2 (1984): 305-309 .
Müller-Wille, B. (2008). The effect of International terrorism on EU Intelligence co-
operation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(1), 49–73.
Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 4(2), 286–295. Retrieved from https://www.cs.upc.edu/~ia/nash51.pdf doi: 10.2307/1969529
Nesi, G. (2006). International cooperation in counter-terrorism: The United Nations and
regional organizations in the fight against terrorism. Hampshire, England: Ashgate
Publishing.
Neumann, J. v., & Morgenstern, O. (2007). Theory of games and economic behavior (60th
Anniversary ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Error! Filename not specified.
Niou, E. M., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1994). A game-theoretic interpretation of Sun Tzu's The
Art of War. Journal of Peace Research, 31(2), 161–174. Retrieved
from https://sites.duke.edu/niou/files/2011/06/08-Sun-Tzu-English-
version.pdf doi: 10.1177/0022343394031002004
Ogilvie- White, T. (2006). Non proliferation and counter terrorism cooperation in southeast
Asia: Meeting global obligations through regional security architectures? Contemporary
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 28(1), 1–26.
Peter, C. (1994). EU counterterrorism, the maastricht third pillar, and liberal democratic
acceptability. Terrorism and Political Violence, 6(2), 103–145.
Pita, J., Jain, M., Marecki, J., Ordóñez, F., Portway, C., Tambe, M., … Kraus, S. (2012). De
ployed ARMOR protection: The application of a game-theoretic model for security at the
Los Angeles International Airport. In M. Tambe (Ed.), Security and game theory:
Algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned (pp. 67–87). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Pita, J., Tambe, M., Kiekintveld, C., Cullen, S., & Steigerwald, E. (2012). GUARDS:
Game-theoretic security allocation on a national Scale. In M. Tambe (Ed.), Security and
game theory: Algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned (pp. 107–130). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Prakash, A., & Wellman, M. P. (2015). Empirical game-theoretic analysis for moving target
defense. In Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on moving target defense (pp. 57–
65). Denver: ACM.
Reveron, S. D. (2008). Counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. Journal of Global
Change and Governance, 1(33), 1–13.
Romaniuk, P. (2010). Multilateral counter-terrorism: The global politics of cooperation and
contestation. New York: Routledge.
Rousseau, J.-J. (1984). A discourse on inequality (1984 ed.). (M. Cranston,
trans.). London: Penguin Group.
Sandler, T. (2005). Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism. Public
Choice, 124, 75–93. doi: 10.1007/s11127-005-4747-y
Sandler, T., & Arce, D. G. (2007). Terrorism: A game-theoretic approach.
In T. Sandler & K. Hartley (Eds.), Handbook of defense economics (Vol. 2 (pp. 775–
813). Amsterdam & Oxford: Elsevier B.V.
Sandler, T., & Enders, W. (2004). An economic perspective on transnational
terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(2), 301–316.
doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.12.007
Skyrms, Brian. (2004) The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Smith, M., & Zeigler, S. M. (2017). Terrorism before and after 9/11 – A more dangerous
world? Research and Politics.
Stackelberg, H. v. (2011). In D. Bazin, L. Urch, & R. Hill (Eds.), Market structure and equilibrium (2011 ed.). Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London & New York: Springer.
Saadat, S. Y. (2020) International cooperation for counter-terrorism: a strategic perspective,
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 15:1, 83-93, DOI:
10.1080/18335330.2020.1732451
START. (2018, July). Global terrorism database. Retrieved from National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START): https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
Tsai, J., Rathi, S., Kiekintveld, C., Ordóñez, F., & Tambe, M. (2012). IRIS – A tool for
strategic security allocation in transportation networks. In M. Tambe (Ed.), Security and
game theory: Algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned (pp. 88–106). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Tzu, S. (1963). The art of war (1963 ed.). (S. B. Griffith, trans.). New York: Oxford
University Press.
UN. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development. New
York: United Nations.
UN. (2019). Global indicator framework for the sustainable development goals and targets
of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. New York: United Nations.
Vadlamudi, S. G., Sengupta, S., Taguinod, M., Zhao, Z., Doupé, A., Ahn, G.-J.,
& Kambhampati, S. (2016). Moving target defense for web applications using Bayesian
Stackelberg games. In Proceedings of the 2016 international Conference on Autonomous
Agents & Multiagent systems (pp. 1377–1378). Singapore: International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
Zhu, Q., & Başar, T. (2013). Game-theoretic approach to feedback-driven multi-stage
moving target defense. In D. S.K., N.-R. C., & K. M. (Eds.), Decision and game theory for
security (Vol. 8252 (pp. 246–263). Cham: Springer.
Zhuang, R., DeLoach, S. A., & Ou, X. (2014). Towards a theory of moving target defense.
In Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on moving target defense (pp. 31–
40). Scottsdale: ACM.
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