Mohaamad javad fathi; soherh pirani; Akbar ghafoori
Abstract
One of the central issues is the impact of the idea and assumption of strategic loneliness on the goals, motives, and regional strategies of the decision-making elites of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the tense and critical area of West Asia. The current research investigates why the Islamic ...
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One of the central issues is the impact of the idea and assumption of strategic loneliness on the goals, motives, and regional strategies of the decision-making elites of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the tense and critical area of West Asia. The current research investigates why the Islamic Republic of Iran suffers from strategic loneliness, and which doctrines have it used to get out of strategic loneliness? The study hypothesizes that the change of regime from Pahlavi to the Islamic Republic caused, on the one hand, Iran to have practically no stable and robust ally except Syria. On the other hand, a front of allies within the region and beyond has surrounded the country. This issue has led Iran to endogenous deterrence and abroad activities to cope with foreign threats. The findings show that supporting liberation movements, blocking threat sources, confronting the United States, deterring US regional allies, alongside prominent strategies such as regional ban and counter-access, unconventional land and sea warfare, classical and neo-ballistic missile deterrence, drone industry, Hezbollah model, and Lebanonization, alliances with trans-regional actors, religious and cultural diplomacy indicate the wrong idea of strategic loneliness. Iran follows these policies to get out of strategic loneliness and regional isolation. The research method is qualitative and refers to the primary library documents.
Mohammad Javad Fathi; Abdolvahab Yosefinezhad
Abstract
The Syrian crisis has threatened the interests of the Russian Federation more than any other transregional actor; therefore, to protect its interests in the strategic region of the Middle East and the Mediterranean subsystem, it has sought to manage the developments. The central question of the research ...
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The Syrian crisis has threatened the interests of the Russian Federation more than any other transregional actor; therefore, to protect its interests in the strategic region of the Middle East and the Mediterranean subsystem, it has sought to manage the developments. The central question of the research is what are the characteristics of the Russian model of crisis management in Syria? To answer this question, Charles Hermann’s Crisis Cube theoretical model and the three components of “threat”, “time”, and “awareness” have been used. The crisis has left Russia with a choice between three management models: peaceful and software, coercive and aggressive, and intelligent management. In the Syrian crisis, the threat to Russia's core values is insignificant and on the other hand, there is plenty of time to respond to threats, and of course, there is a lack of awareness of the events and where they occur; hence, according to the Crisis Cube model, the Russian Federation's interpretation of the developments in Syria is that the crisis is slow, so there is no urgency for aggressive and coercive actions. The findings show that the Russian officials, based on the type of inference and interpretation of the three main characteristics of the Crisis Cube, concluded that the model of intelligent crisis management with the priority of using software levers will bring about better results for them. This research has been done qualitatively using a descriptive-analytical approach and the method of data collection has been documentary-library method.
